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 Abstract
To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a
simultaneous structural two-equations model that speciﬁes the probability of a
bailout and banks’ risk taking. We identify the effect of expected bailout probabili-
ties on risk taking using exclusion restrictions based on regional political, supervi-
sor, and banking market traits. The sample includes all observed capital preserva-
tion measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995-
2006. The marginal effect of risk with respect to bailout expectations is 7.2 basis
points. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the
probability of ofﬁcial distress from 6.2% to 9.9%. Only interventions directly tar-
geting bank management and, to a lesser extent, penalties mitigate moral hazard.
Weak interventions, such as warnings, do not reduce moral hazard.
Key words: banking, supervision, moral hazard, intervention, bailouts
JEL: C30, C78, G21, G28, L51Non-technical summary
We analyze in this paper if safety nets in banking create moral hazard.
Speciﬁcally,weanswerthequestionifcapitalpreservationmeasuresinduce
additional risk-taking. To this end, we develop a simple game-theoretical
model to describe the actions of regulatory institutions and banks. The
model is used to derive a structural system of equations.
The ﬁrst equation yields estimates of expected probabilities to receive cap-
ital support if a bank is in distress. The second equation then measures if
and how expected bail-out probabilities affect the risk of banks. This allows
us to test, if moral hazard exists and how large it is. We estimate this system
with both two-stage and joint maximum likelihood methods using data on
observed capital injections and distressed exits among German banks dur-
ing the period 1994 until 2006.
Results show that capital preservation measures create moral hazard. The
marginaleffectofriskwithrespecttobailoutexpectationsis7.2basispoints.
A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the
probabilityofofﬁcialdistressfrom6.2%to9.9%.Onlyinterventionsdirectly
targeting bank management and, to a lesser extent, penalties mitigate moral
hazard. Weak interventions, such as warnings, do not reduce moral hazard.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht, ob die Existenz von Sicherungssyste-
men zu einer höheren Risikoneigung im Bankwesen führt, das so genannte
"Moral Hazard" Problem. Wir betrachten, ob kapitalerhaltende Maßnah-
men seitens der Säulen-speziﬁschen Sicherungssysteme zu einer höheren
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Schieﬂage bei Banken führen. Wir entwickeln ein
einfaches Spiele-theoretisches Modell, um das Verhalten von Banken und
Regulatoren ab zu bilden. Das Modell dient dazu, ein strukturelles Glei-
chungssystem auf zu stellen.
Die erste Gleichung des Systems dient der empirischen Schätzung von Bei-
standswahrscheinlichkeiten. Die zweite Gleichung misst, ob und wie stark
erwarteteBeistandswahrscheinlichkeitendasRisikoeinerBankbeeinﬂußen.
Wir schätzen dieses Gleichungssystem mittels eines zweistuﬁgen und eines
simultanen Verfahrens und nutzen eine Stichprobe beobachteter Kapitalhil-
fen und Marktaustritte deutscher Banken im Zeitraum von 1994 bis 2004.
Die Ergebnisse belegen die Existenz von "Moral Hazard". Der marginal Ef-
fekt einer höheren Beistandswahrscheinlichkeit auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit
einer Schieﬂage beträgt 7,2 Basispunkte. Eine Veränderung der erwarteten
Beistandswahrscheinlichkeit um zwei Standardabweichungen steigert die
Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Schieﬂage somit von 6.2% auf 9.9%. Die Analyse
vonInteraktionseffektenmitregulatorischenEingriffenzeigtaußerdem,dass
bestimmte Interventionen "Moral Hazard" reduzieren können. Allerdings
sind dies nur jene Eingriffe, welche direkt auf das Management einer Bank
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 1 Introduction
Many economies maintain deposit insurance schemes to protect depositors
against losses when a bank fails to meet its debt obligations. In addition,
selected banks may receive capital from regulatory authorities or govern-
ments when in distress, in the form of so-called “bailouts”. Financial safety
nets for individual banks aim to reduce the social cost of bank failures 1 and
promote ﬁnancial stability (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). For ex-
ample, deposit insurance can help prevent bank runs (Diamond and Dyb-
vig, 1983) and mitigate the potential spill over effects of bankruptcies. Yet
such safety nets also can create moral hazard in the form of excessive risk-
taking behavior. 2 We develop a structural model to estimate empirically
the extent to which bank bailouts create moral hazard.
When a bank is in distress, it is difﬁcult to determine if this state is due to
bad luck or bad behavior. To address this problem, we develop a structural
simultaneous equations model based on a simple game between supervis-
ing authorities (the regulator) and individual banks. Individual banks ﬁrst
choose their preferred risk level. Then nature determines if the bank is in
distress,andtheregulatormustdecidewhethertobailoutdistressedbanks.
The model therefore identiﬁes a distressed bank’s latent bailout probability,
and we test if bailout expectations explain risk-taking behavior.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate a structural system of two equations. The ﬁrst
equation relates bailout probabilities to individual bank characteristics and
several (identifying) covariates. It therefore provides an expected bailout
probability for all banks, including sound ones. The second equation then
1 Due to, for example, distorting credit markets (Puri et al., 2011) or bank competition (Gropp et al., 2011).
2 See Gale and Vives (2002), Cordella and Yeyati (2003), and Freixas et al. (2004).
1relates banks’ risk-taking propensity to these expected bailout probabilities.
If they affect banks’ risk taking, safety nets create moral hazard.
The structural estimation approach thus represents the ﬁrst contribution
of this paper. Most empirical studies rely on reduced-form analyses and
regress risk proxies on indicators of safety net membership (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). But insurance scheme membership does not
permit inference about banks’ bailout expectations when in distress. Instead,
we need to observe actual bailouts to predict bailout expectations, condi-
tional on factors that are unrelated to risk taking. This identiﬁcation issue is
usually neglected, which precludes the separation of bad luck from bad be-
haviorwhenanalyzingtheeffectsofsafetynetsonrisktaking. 3 Tothisend,
we use regional variables that capture political factors (Brown and Dinç,
2005), historical bailout policies (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007), banking
market structure, and regulators’ traits (Brown and Dinç, 2011), which ex-
plain bailout probabilities, but do not directly affect risk taking. These co-
variates are speciﬁed in the bailout equation but not in the risk-taking equa-
tion. We use this model to quantify the moral hazard effect in terms of ad-
ditional risk.
As our second contribution, we use a novel data set that includes actual
bailouts and ofﬁcial records of distress, as deﬁned by regulatory authorities
for all 3,517 German banks during the period 1995-2006. Observing cap-
ital injections allows us to exploit regional differences across supervisory
authorities involved in the bailout decision to identify bailout expectations
in the structural model. Observing incidences that constitute bank distress
according to the deﬁnition of the regulator also enables us to measure risk
3 Keeley (1990) uses deposit insurance payouts to explain risk, but does not model bailout expectations explicitly.
2more directly. Speciﬁcally, the regulator deﬁnes distress as a situation in
which “an institution’s existence will be endangered [...] without support mea-
sures.” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p. 75). Support measures are either
exits through restructuring mergers or capital injections. Observations of
either bailout or exit thus reveal when the regulator deems the ultimate
risk faced by a bank as too high, namely that it ceases to operate as a go-
ing concern. Relating bailout expectations to distress probabilities is thus in
line with the metric used by regulators to conduct policy and with so-called
bank hazard studies that estimate the risk of an entire ﬁnancial institution
failing, conditional on multiple sources of banking risk (Wheelock and Wil-
son, 1995; Berger et al., 2000). On average 8% of all banks were distressed,
and around 6.1% received capital support.
Third, this article answers the question of whether potential moral hazard
effects due to the existence of safety nets can be mitigated by supervisory
policy. To this end, we exploit detailed information regarding a range of
supervisory intervention measures, such as hearings, the dismissal of man-
agers, or penalties levied on the bank, that were applied to both distressed
and sound banks. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to test if such super-
visory interventions can help mitigate moral hazard and to provide an esti-
mate of how effective various supervisory measures are.
Our results reveal that an increase in the expected bailout probability by
1% increases risk taking, measured as the likelihood of distress, by 7.2 basis
points. A change in the expected bailout probability from one standard de-
viation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases
predicted distress probabilities from 6.15% to 9.85%. This economically sig-
niﬁcant increase in risk taking is due to moral hazard. The result is robust
3across a range of alternative measures of risk, estimation techniques, and
subsamples. Only supervisory interventions directly targeting bank man-
agement and, to a lesser extent, those involving penalties change risk taking
due to bailout expectations. Supervisors thus have means to mitigate moral
hazard. Other interventions, such as warnings or business restrictions, may
reduce risk taking, but they seem ineffective to reduce moral hazard.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss the theoretical structural equa-
tions model we propose and our speciﬁcation in Section 2. The data and
identiﬁcation strategy are described in Section 3. We discuss the results in
Section 4 before concluding.
2 Structural model and econometrics
To identify moral hazard in the German banking system, we cannot simply
regress a bank’s risk-taking behavior on bailouts, because such a procedure
suffers from endogeneity problems. Any bailed out bank is of course in
some sort of distress. Thus, imposing some structure on the data is nec-
essary to separate bad luck from bad behavior. We describe the multiple
authorities involved in the bailout decision in Section 3. For ease of expo-
sition, we refer to them collectively as “the regulator.” We consider a static
game played every period between individual banks and the regulator and
assume that an individual bank disregards the actions of peers when mak-
ing its own choices. We therefore can model many simultaneous two-player
games between individual banks and the regulator. The model is similar to
Cordella and Yeyati’s (2003) but tailored to our empirical estimation.
–Figure A.1 around here –
4The timing and choices are depicted in Figure A.1. At T = 0, an individ-
ual banks chooses its “riskiness”, zit, which can be mapped directly to the
probability of distress P(zit). 4 The regulator cannot observe this riskiness
directly. At T = 1 though, the consequences of the risk-taking behavior of
banks are revealed, and the regulator may declare a bank “distressed” and
weigh the cost of a bailout against the cost of a bank exiting.
It is clear that always bailing out a bank that is in distress causes severe
moral hazard problems (Gale and Vives, 2002). The regulator instead wants
todeviseabailoutpolicythatbalancesdistressduetobadluckwithdistress
due to bad behavior. The regulator faces a classical commitment problem
though and cannot credibly “announce” a certain bailout probability for
every bank at T = 0. For example, if a bank is “too big to fail,” it gets saved
irrespective of what the regulator has announced a priori. 5
Because the static game is sequential, a mixed strategy is not optimal, and
the regulator will only play pure strategies: bail out or not (as in Cordella
and Yeyati, 2003). The only way for the regulator to mitigate the moral haz-
ard problem is by not revealing which bank “types” it will bail out and thus
trying to be unpredictable. Individual banks do not know which type they
are and thus do not know for sure which pure strategy the regulator will
4 Although banks do not choose distress probabilities directly, they make business choices, about lending or
trading for example, that inﬂuence the distress likelihood. Different sources of risk may offset one another. For
example, high credit risk due to subprime lending does not have to imply a high risk of distress for the entire
bank if the loan share is low and most assets are risk-free securities. In practice, the regulator therefore rates banks
based according to the likelihood that the entire institution is distressed, conditional on multiple risk drivers
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007).
5 This commitment problem also rules out dynamic strategies. Intuitively, if a bank is not bailed out, the game
ends. The only dynamic strategy is thus to bail out the bank for a certain maximum number of periods before
letting it exit. Such a strategy can only be optimal for banks that are worth saving. But this cannot be a Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, because once it is revealed that a bank that is worth saving is in distress, the regulator
will not commit to this strategy, because it can improve by bailing out the bank anyway. Cordella and Yeyati
(2003) deal with such dynamics by only considering Markov strategies, so that the dynamic problem becomes
recursive.
5play. However, individual banks (and researchers) can infer a probability of
a bailout by linking bailout behavior to observables.
To capture the banks’ expectations of the regulator’s behavior, we model
the bailout probability pit when a bank is in distress as:
pit = E[Iit] = F(X0
it 1a + Z0
itb) (bailout) , (1)
where Iit is an indicator equal to 1 if the regulator decides to inject capital
and bail out the bank, F() is the standard-normal distribution function,
and Xit 1 is a lagged vector of observable bank i (and macro) variables at
time t   1. To discern the effect of bailout probabilities on risk taking, we
require two assumptions. First, the necessary vector of identifying covari-
ates Zit must be orthogonal to risk taking. Because identiﬁcation is crucial,
we motivate the choices for Zit separately in Section 3. Second, we assume
that a bailed out bank otherwise would have exited: that is, the regulator
only rescues banks that really need support. This assumption is necessary
because of the missing counterfactual. 6 The implied error term is standard-
normally distributed. It captures information that is unobservable by indi-
vidual banks, but taken into account by the regulator. Because of the private
informationavailabletotheregulator,wehave pit < 1,andnobankexpects
zero downside risk or a guaranteed safety net. At t = 0, a bank’s manage-








6 It is impossible to know if some bailed out banks would have survived without an injection.
7 We consider a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Individual beliefs ˆ pit about a bailout must correspond to
the actual bailout distribution in equilibrium, so that ˆ pit = pit. For brevity, we use real probabilities directly.
6such that we directly write the objective in recursive form. Furthermore,
Vi,t is the value of bank i at time t, Rit is the discount rate, and Et[ci(zit)] is
the expected cash ﬂow ci, which depends on the riskiness zit. The expected
value E[Vi,t] therefore equals the expected value of the net cash ﬂows plus
the expected value at time t+1 if the bank has not exited. Distress happens
with probability P(zit). If banks are never bailed out, distress means exit,
and the probability of exiting is equal to the probability of distress. The
probability of exiting declines with 1   pit though. We see that pit = 1
implies that the bank will not exit for sure and the expected future value
E[Vi,t+1] is guaranteed.
Assuming an interior solution 8 , we consider a linear approximation of the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal individual bank behavior
zit = gpit + X0
it 1k, (3)
where Xit 1 is the same set of covariates as in the bailout Equation (1). Con-
sequently, we can write the equation for the probability of distress as
P(zit) = E[Dit] = F(gpit + X0
it 1k) (distress) , (4)
where Dit is an indicator equal to 1 if the bank is in distress and 0 if sound.
This is the second key equation of our model.
In summary, the parameter of interest is g, the coefﬁcient for the bailout
probability. We aim to identify, for example, if large banks take more risk
simply because they are large (direct effect through k) or because they are
more likely to be bailed out (indirect effect through g). It is impossible to
8 As in Cordella and Yeyati (2003) this assumption rules out implausible outcomes such as inﬁnite risk.
7draw such inferences by regressing probabilities of distress on bank char-
acteristics directly, which constitutes the appeal of our structural model.
We estimate this system of simultaneous equations deﬁned by Equations
(1) and (4) in a two-step procedure. First, we estimate Equation (1) with
maximum likelihood to estimate the bailout probability conditional on the
bank being in distress. With ˆ a and ˆ b at hand, we calculate the ﬁtted (or ex-
pected) bailout probability ˆ pit for the entire sample of banks. Second, we
estimate Equation (4) while including this generated regressor ˆ p. Under
standard regularity conditions, the ﬁrst-step maximum likelihood estimate
yields consistent estimates of the true parameters. Therefore, we also ob-
tain consistent estimates for the second equation (see Murphy and Topel,
2002). 9
3 Identiﬁcation and data
3.1 Bailouts and risk
Bailouts are deﬁned as a bank receiving a capital injection from the re-
sponsible banking association’s insurance fund. The baseline speciﬁcation
isEquation(4),whichmeasuresrisktakingwithanindicatoriftheregulator
deemsthebankindistress.Asnotedbefore,distressisdeﬁnedasasituation
9 We also estimate Equations (1) and (4) jointly using maximum likelihood and substitute the equation for pit
directly into the equation for F(zit). The individual contributions lit to the likelihood are:
lit = 1  F(gF(X0
it 1a + Z0
itb) + X0












itb) if D = 1 and I = 1. (5c)
This estimation procedure yields consistent and efﬁcient estimates, but it is computationally involved.
8where the bank’s existence will be endangered without support measures
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007). Support measures are either a bailout or the
exit of the bank in the form of a restructuring merger. In Germany, both
events are recorded by the central bank, the Bundesbank. Observing these
policies, bailout or exit, therefore reveals when the regulator deems the ul-
timate risk faced by a bank too high, namely to cease as a going concern.
This approach to measure risk is consistent with, for example, U.S. bank
hazard studies that estimate the risk that an entire ﬁnancial institution will
fail, conditional on multiple sources of banking risk, rather than consider-
ing only individual components, such as credit risk (Wheelock and Wilson,
1995; Berger et al., 2000). 10 Measuring risk with distress probabilities is also
in line with the metric used by regulators to rate banks and determine pol-
icy. 11 To assess the generalizability of our results, we specify alternative
risk-taking proxies according to Equation (3). These continuous measures
pertain to speciﬁc sources of risk (see Table B.1 in the Appendix), which we
discuss with the relevant results subsequently.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of distressed and sound banks over
time. On average 8% of all banks were distressed per year between 1995
and 2006. Most banks have been bailed out (6.1%), and the share of exits
due to restructuring mergers is fairly low (1.9%).
–Table 1 around here –
For ease of exposition, we use the single term regulator, though in prac-
10 Prompt corrective action in the U.S. implies that troubled banks are immediately closed. In Germany, distressed
banksareeithersupportedthroughrecapitalizationormergedwithhealthybanks(Koetteretal.,2007).Thesubtle
difference between failures and distress reﬂects preemptive rather than prompt corrections.
11 Since 2004, the Bundesbank has published probabilities of distress conditional on risk sources, as reﬂected by
so-called CAMEL covariates (capitalization, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity) in ﬁnancial stability
reports.
9tice, the decision to bailout or merge a bank involves multiple authorities.
First, the German Financial Supervision Authority (BaFin) is responsible
for banking supervision in Germany. Second, the central bank is responsi-
ble for ongoing supervision. Third, audits for the savings and cooperative
banking sectors are conducted by regional banking associations.
InsurancefundsreﬂectthestructureoftheGermanbankingindustry,which
features three sectors, or “pillars”: commercial banks, cooperative banks,
and savings banks. 12 Compulsory and sector-speciﬁc, voluntary insurance
schemes coexist and are organized in 38 national 13 or regional banking as-
sociations per pillar (IMF, 2009). Insurance protection comprises deposit in-
surance and institutional warrants ("Institutssicherung"). The latter provide
the capital injections that we consider. 14
Insurance funds generally obtain information on the ﬁnancial health of
member banks from auditors, but prudential supervisors also can directly
inform insurance funds if they deem a bank excessively risky. For example
the charter of regional insurance funds in the savings bank sector stipulates
that the board of a regional savings associations must decide, with a two-
thirds majority, whether to declare a member bank distressed. 15 Declaring
a member distressed triggers according support measures, either a restruc-
turing merger or a capital injection. The insurance fund of the association
then informs the management and owners of the bank of the decision. They
are also required by law to inform the supervisory authorities, namely, the
BaFin and Bundesbank. Supported member banks are required to reveal
12 Krahnen and Schmidt (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of the German banking system. We detail our
results for sub-samples to control, for example, for different ownership of banks from the three pillars.
13 The Association of German Banks ("BdB"), the German Savings and Loan Association ("DSGV"), and the
Federal Association of Cooperative Banks ("BVR").
14 Note that we do not consider bailouts by the government or the Banking Sector Stabilization Fund ("Soﬁn").
15 See http://www.sparkasse.de/s_ﬁnanzgruppe/haftungsverbund/sicherungsreserve.html.
10any information to the fund to allow for a transparent assessment of their
ﬁnancial situation.
Insurance schemes’ objectives may not always be in line with those of of-
ﬁcial supervisory institutions. Eventually though, all institutions involved
collectively contribute to the decision to bail out a bank or not. For our pur-
poses, we do not need to know how the decision to bail out is made, but
only whether it is made. We simply try to discern whether the system of
institutions as a whole induces moral hazard. It is the very diversity of in-
stitutions involved in the bailout and distress resolution procedure that we
exploit for identiﬁcation, which we describe next.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
The identiﬁcation of the moral hazard parameter g, based on functional
form alone, is possible but not compelling because we might simply mea-
sure a nonlinear relationship. Instead, we assume that banks that receive
support would have failed otherwise, and we need exclusion restrictions
on the covariates. Therefore, we specify identifying covariates Zit in Equa-
tion (1) that are correlated with the bailout probability but not with the
probability of distress, as we describe in Table 2.
–Table 2 around here –
First, multiple regional and pillar-speciﬁc insurance funds exist to support
troubled member institutions in regional banking markets, which may dif-
fer in their willingness and ability to save distressed banks (Acharya and
Yorulmazer, 2007; IMF, 2009). 16 We exploit this variation to explain bailout
16 Data on insurance funds’ ﬁnances and/or pricing schemes are not available.
11probabilities in Equation (1), because the willingness and ability to bail out
as such suggests limited correlation with the direct risk taking of banks. We
specify the number of rescued banks as a share of all distressed banks per
state in the previous period to capture the historical capital injection fre-
quency in each of the 16 states. We also acknowledge that the “too-many-
to-fail” notion suggests that bailouts are less likely if the system already is
weak (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2011). Regulators
might consider the number of banks left to provide ﬁnancial services to the
region insufﬁcient if no bailout was conducted. Therefore, we also specify
the number of banks in each of the 413 German counties.
Second, we create a set of covariates motivated by studies that empha-
size the importance of politicians in economic decisions, including bailouts
(Brown and Dinç, 2005) and privatization (Dinç and Gupta, 2011). Politi-
cal considerations may be important in the German banking industry for
three reasons. First, board members of both the BaFin and the Bundes-
bank are suggested by politicians. Formally, the Ministry of Finance ap-
points board members. But e.g. Bundesbank board members are suggested
by (alternating) state governments. Second, around 20% of all banks are
(regional) government-owned savings banks. Local politicians often serve
on the supervisory boards of savings banks and inﬂuence regional associ-
ations, which both audit member banks and maintain regional insurance
funds. Third, for banks of the remaining two pillars, commercial and co-
operative, (local) politicians often serve on the supervisory boards. Ideally,
we would use direct information on the political membership of individual
bank managers and directors, but such data are unavailable. Instead, we
use indirect proxies and specify an indicator for state elections, that is, the
margin of votes casted for the state cabinet coalition relative to the main op-
12position, as in Dinç and Gupta (2011), and the political stance of the govern-
ing state cabinet (e.g., conservatives vs. socialists). We discuss each variable
in greater detail when presenting the baseline results in Subsection 4.1.
Third, we use identifying covariates to capture regulator traits. Political
controls in a bank’s region might inﬂuence bailouts indirectly by shaping
the attitude of supervisors, supervisory boards, management, and the gen-
eral public. But eventually, one of 38 responsible regional banking asso-
ciation audits and insures banks. Also, nine branches of the central bank
("Hauptverwaltung")conductongoing(on-site)supervisionofbanksintheir
regions. Both institutions may differ in terms of auditor capacity, practices
to implement federal guidelines and laws for prudential supervision, or
funds to conduct bailouts. Detailed data on stafﬁng, practices, or funding
of banking associations, insurance funds, or central bank branches are un-
available. However, we have data on both banking association membership
and the responsible central bank branch for each individual bank and there-
fore can specify indicator variables to control for unobservable differences
among regulatory institutions.
3.3 Covariates
Following previous bank hazard studies and the practice of regulators to
rate banks, we select bank-speciﬁc covariates Xit 1 from a long list of candi-
datecovariatesusingastatisticalselectionprocedure(HosmerandLemshow,
2000). All covariates are lagged by one period to mitigate simultaneity con-
cerns (Wheelock and Wilson, 1995; Berger et al., 2000). Table 3 shows the
meansandstandarddeviationsofthebankcharacteristicspertypeofevent.
13–Table 3 around here –
The sub-samples are not too heterogeneous, which is comforting because
weuseﬁttedvaluestoextrapolatepredictedbailoutprobabilitiesfromEqua-
tion (1) to estimate the moral hazard effect on risk taking in Equation (4).
Hidden reserves are used to smooth income and are an important indica-
tor of solvency risk. They result from mark-below-market valuation, in line
with §340f of the German commercial code (HGB), and are measured as a
share of total assets. Non-performing loans measure credit risk and are de-
ﬁned as the share of all audited loans that are at latent risk. We measure
the share relative to total audited loans. Customer loans are the share of
household and corporate to total loans, and they measure credit risk, too.
Proﬁtability is measured as operating return relative to total equity. To con-
trol for the increasing importance of non-credit-based activities and asset
price risk, we also specify the ratio of fee and trading income relative to
interest income. Cost efﬁciency measures managerial skill. It is the percent-
age of actual cost that would have sufﬁced to provide observed produc-
tion plans, derived from a stochastic frontier model (for details, see Koetter
and Poghosyan, 2009). To control for liquidity risk, we specify the sum of
cash and overnight interbank assets relative to total assets. A dummy for
joint stock or limited partnerships (“Kapitalgesellschaften”) accounts for the
stricter publication requirements that these forms of incorporation entail.
The importance of a bank for the ﬁnancial system clearly is a key determi-
nant for both bailouts and risk taking, such as when they serve to reduce
negative externalities if a large and highly connected bank fails. We control
for size with a decile indicator based on the distribution of gross total as-
14sets. 17 We also specify the bank’s market share of gross total assets in its
county (“Kreis”).
To control for the health of the corporate sector, the economic cycle, and the
ﬁnancial stance of households, we specify three regional macro covariates.
These are the share of enterprises that ﬁled for bankruptcy per state relative
to all ﬁrms, annual growth of real Gross State Product (GSP) per capita, and
state unemployment rates, all of which may inﬂuence both bailouts and
risk-taking. In addition, we include banking-pillar and time dummies.
4 Results
4.1 Identiﬁcation of moral hazard effects on risk taking
Table 4 shows the marginal effects from two-step probit estimations of the
bailout Equation (1) and the distress Equation (4). Standard errors are clus-
tered at the bank level, and we control for cross-sectional correlation by
specifying time dummies, as suggested by Petersen (2009).
–Table 4 around here –
The main result in the ﬁrst pair of columns, labeled Parsimonious, is the sig-
niﬁcantly positive effect of higher bailout probabilities on risk taking. An
increase of predicted bailout probability by 1% increases the likelihood of
distress by 6.3 basis points. Consider Figure A.2 for an illustration of the
economic signiﬁcance of this marginal effect. The ﬁgure shows the distri-
bution of conditional bailout expectations and predicted distress, together
17 Total assets and log total assets yield similar results. We prefer decile indicators because they attribute less
weight to the tails of the skewed size distribution when extrapolating bailout probabilities to sound banks.
15with the mean and standard deviation. An increase of bailout expectations
from one standard deviation below the mean (bailout expectation = 37.8%)
to one standard deviation above the mean (bailout expectation = 89.4%),
multiplied by the marginal effect, yields an increase in predicted risk of
51.6%  0.063 = 3.2%. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure A.2, the
average distress probability is 8%, so this increase amounts to roughly one-
third of the average distress probability.
Therefore, the effect of moral hazard is economically substantial and among
the largest compared with other risk drivers. The only risk determinant of
similar magnitude that can be inﬂuenced directly by managers is the share
of hidden reserves.
This estimate of g relies on four identifying covariates. The ﬁrst relates to
an arguably important event to inﬂuence the behavior of politicians: elec-
tions. Governments that hold a stake in the banking system may abuse
their inﬂuence to pursue non-value-maximizing objectives to realize polit-
ical objectives, such as re-election (Sapienza, 2004; Brown and Dinç, 2005).
The indicator for state parliament elections is signiﬁcantly negative. Bank
bailouts seem unpopular among political constituents, and they are signif-
icantly less likely during election periods.
Dinç and Gupta (2011) similarly show that the privatization of Indian en-
terprises is more likely if political competition from the main opposition
is low. They measure political competition by the margin of votes earned
by the governing coalition in a region compared with the vote share of the
main opposition coalition. We specify this vote share difference in state par-
liament elections using votes cast at the county level. Although the direct
effect of vote share differences is insigniﬁcant in our sample, it may matter
16which political party has larger vote share difference (e.g., conservatives
or socialists). Therefore, we interact vote share differences with categorical
dummies based on the political stance of the cabinet coalition and discuss
these results subsequently.
The number of banks has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence in bailout considerations.
Historicalrescuesmeasuredbylaggedinjectionfrequencyperstate,inturn,
increase the likelihood of a bank bailout signiﬁcantly. As such, the injec-
tion frequency per state signals local reputation effects to the banks. States
withtraditionallylowbail-outfrequenciesarelikelytomaintainthatstance.
More frequent recourse to insurance funds does not seem to render subse-
quent bailouts less likely because the funds are depleted.
The ﬁt of the bailout and the distress equations is good: pseudo-R2s are
around 17%. Marginal effects of bank-speciﬁc covariates are plausible and
in line with prior evidence regarding bank distress in Germany (Koetter
et al., 2007). Larger banks with high local market shares are more likely to
receive capital support, which corroborates the too-big-to-fail effect docu-
mented by O’Hara and Wayne (1990) for the U.S. banking market, for ex-
ample. Higher insolvency risk, as reﬂected by lower lower hidden reserves,
and more credit risk, as measured by the non-performing loan and cus-
tomer loan shares, are also associated with a higher likelihood of a bailout.
Proﬁtability levels, income structure, and liquidity are not, or only weakly
signiﬁcant. 18 Regarding macroeconomic factors, only a fragile corporate
sector,measuredbycorporateinsolvencies,hasapositiveeffectonthebailout
likelihoods of banks. Repullo and Martinez-Miera (2010) show that risk
(and competition) in banking interacts with corporate sector stability, and
18 Ideally, we would use superior liquidity measures based on maturities, as suggested by Berger and Bouwman
(2009). The necessary data unfortunately are unavailable.
17regulators may aim to avoid aggravating corporate distress by letting banks
fail if the non-ﬁnancial sector is weak.
Proper identiﬁcation is central in our study of moral hazard effects on risk
taking. Therefore, we include in the second pair of columns, labeled Poli-
tics, identifying covariates to control for coalitions’ substantially different
attitudes toward market interventions. We assume that cast votes reﬂect
the political preferences of the constituency in the county; thus, a regional
population with a communist heritage in regions of the former German
Democratic Republic is likely to take a fundamentally different stance to-
ward rescuing banks compared than are liberal democrats. 19
The effect of different parties’ stances on bailout policies should be reﬂected
in the formed coalition and ampliﬁed if the margin of votes is larger. We
therefore deﬁne an indicator for three different types of coalitions that have
been formed in parliament elections of the 16 states of Germany since 1992.
Conservatives denotes coalitions that involve the Christian Democratic Party
(CDU) or the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), its sibling party in the state
of Bavaria. Socialists denotes coalitions that involve the Social Democratic
Party (SPD). In addition, three smaller parties are increasingly important to
form coalitions at both the state and the federal level. 20 The two main po-
litical camps have lost considerable ground in recent years to these smaller
parties.Consequently,so-calledgreatcoalitionsbetweenCDU/CSUandSPD
have often become necessary to obtain the majority of votes, which are the
19 For example, Dinç and Gupta (2011) specify the vote share of the communist party to explain privatization
choices in India. Alternative speciﬁcations using the vote shares of different parties directly did not yield a more
precise identiﬁcation. Results are available on request.
20 Namely, the ecologically oriented Grünen, the successor of the communist party in the GDR Die Linke, and the
liberals FDP. We also considered alternative codings of coalitions emphasizing whether more “extreme” political
opinions represented by these smaller parties were involved in the cabinet. These speciﬁcations did not explain
the variation in bailouts very well but are available on request.
18third group that we specify. The effect of political preferences represented
by these different coalitions on bailout policies should be ampliﬁed if the
vote share difference relative to the main opposition is larger. Therefore, we
specify interaction effects.
Marginal interaction effects in the columns labeled Politics in the second
panel of Table 4 highlight that bailouts are more likely if the bank is located
in states governed by a great coalition relative to conservative cabinets. The
direct effect of a socialist state cabinet is only weakly signiﬁcant. Larger
vote share differences exert no differential effect if either a great coalition
or socialists are in ofﬁce. Conservative cabinets, in turn, are signiﬁcantly
more inclined to bail out troubled banks if they face less political compe-
tition from the opposition. Even when taking into account the additional
identifying covariates, the positive effect of moral hazard on risk taking,
individual covariates’ effects, the signiﬁcant contribution of past injection
frequencies, and the election dummy to explain bailouts all remain intact.
The next two pairs of results feature speciﬁcations that control more explic-
itly for potential differences among the various regulatory bodies that are
relevant for explaining observed bailout events. Consider ﬁrst the pair of
columnslabeledAssociations,whichincludesﬁxedeffectsforthe38banking
associations with which individual banks are afﬁliated. For the savings and
cooperative banking pillars, these associations develop and conduct pru-
dential audits of their member banks and host the regional insurance funds
that provide capital injections if needed. Also for the commercial banks,
these association memberships provide a good estimation about monitor-
ing mechanisms across banks in the association. 21 F-tests reported in the
21 The mission statement of regional associations of commercial banks mentions for example the dialogue and
joint pursuit of the interests of their members as an objective. Each regional association is member of the federal
19bottom panel of Table 4 show that the added identifying covariates are
jointly signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcation of association indicators leaves other
parameter estimates, especially the moral hazard coefﬁcient, intact.
The last pair of results, in the columns labeled Regulator, adds dummies for
the nine regional branches of the Bundesbank, which conduct the ongoing
supervision of banks in their regions. These central bank regions do not co-
incide with political borders of the 16 states or the organizational borders
of banking associations’ regions. Therefore, they add information pertain-
ing to regulatory differences that could exist due to, for instance, different
implementations of prudential auditing rules, stafﬁng differences in the re-
gional central bank branches, and the like. F-tests conﬁrm the joint signif-
icance of these covariates. Overall, all previous effects remain unchanged,
and we consider this speciﬁcation the baseline model.
4.2 Alternative risk measures
We argue that the probability of distress is a comprehensive and preferred
measure to assess multiple sources of risk managed by banks. But we ac-
knowledge that supervisory data on ﬁnancial distress is rarely publicly
available. To test whether and to what extent we can generalize the iden-
tiﬁed moral hazard effect, we show in Table 5 the relation between moral
hazardandﬁvealternativemeasuresofbankrisk.Tofacilitatecomparisons,
the ﬁrst column of Table 5 reproduces the baseline result. 22
–Table 5 around here –
banking association, which is the legal entity maintaining the voluntary deposit insurance scheme of this pillar.
22 Descriptive statistics of the alternative risk measures are provided in Table B.1 in the Appendix. Predicted
bailout probabilities are obtained from the baseline speciﬁcation (column Regulator in Table 4).





sRoA , where RoA denotes return on risk-weighted assets,
RWA denotes risk-weighted assets, and sRoA is the standard deviation of
RoA. 23 Assuming that insolvency occurs when losses cannot be covered by
equity, the probability of insolvency can be expressed as P(RoA <
Equity
TA ).
If RoA follows a normal distribution, z-scores are inversely related to the
probability of insolvency (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Thus, z-scores can be
interpreted as the number of standard deviations that a bank’s RoA must
fall below its expected value before equity is exhausted and the bank be-
comes insolvent. Lower z-scores therefore indicate riskier banks. The sec-
ond column in Table 5 conﬁrms that higher bailout probabilities increase
risk according to this measure, too. The smaller sample size is due to the
limited availability of risk-weighted assets as opposed to the gross total as-
sets employed in the baseline.
Second,creditriskremainsamongthemostimportantindividualriskdrivers
of ﬁnancial institutions. Most studies proxy for credit risk using the share
of non-performing loans (NPL; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). We
provide the results using the NPL share as the dependent variable in the
third column of Table 5. The main result of increasing moral hazard due to
higher bailout likelihood is conﬁrmed. 24
Third, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and specify only one compo-
nent of the z-score, namely Tier I capital ratios, which measure most di-
rectly the risk of critical under capitalization. Note that capital preservation
23 This measure is calculated on a rolling-window basis of the preceding three years where possible. Using a
constant standard deviation calculated for all available observations per bank does not affect the results.
24 We also ran dynamic panel estimations specifying the lagged values of the NPL share as explanatory variable.
Both the direction and the signiﬁcance of the moral hazard effect are conﬁrmed, but a violation of the Hansen
test casts doubt on the adequacy of the speciﬁcation.
21measures are not part of core capital, so there is no reverse causality by
construction. The insigniﬁcance of the bailout effect underscores that core
capital ratios are hardly adjusted by management in the ﬁrst place. Instead,
capital buffers held as insurance against cyclical shocks pertain primarily to
Tier II-type of capital and hidden reserves (see also Heid, 2007). This result
underscores the importance of accounting for multiple risk drivers simul-
taneously, which is what we do by using the distress indicator.
Fourth, an important source of risk to banks is their sensitivity to interest
rate shocks. One approach to measure interest rate sensitivity is to calcu-
late duration gaps, which is infeasible for our sample though because we
lack data about the maturities of bank’s assets and liabilities. We calculate
two alternative measures available for a subsample of banks. The ﬁrst is
the difference between the volume of assets with a ﬁxed interest rate and
liabilities with a ﬁxed interested rate. Net ﬁxed interest rate assets (NFIRA)
are on average positive (22.8 million e). Larger NIRFA insulate banks from
interest rate shocks compared with banks with large shares of net variable
interest assets. Higher bailout probabilities have a signiﬁcantly negative ef-
fect on NIRFA, which corroborates the notion that moral hazard prevails in
the form of banks reducing interest rate shock insensitive exposures. An-
other measure of interest rate risk is the difference in average interest rates
contracted for ﬁxed assets and liabilities, respectively. The mean ﬁxed in-
terest rate gap (FIRG) is 1.31%, so banks earned a positive margin on their
ﬁxed income exposures. The marginal effect is signiﬁcantly negative too.
This ﬁnding conﬁrms an increase of interest rate risk in response to higher
bailout expectations.
22Insummary,allouralternativeriskmeasuresconﬁrmtheexistenceofmoral
hazard effects due to bank bailouts.
4.3 Robustness
The non-standard nature of the two-equation structural model warrants
multiple robustness checks. Table 6 features coefﬁcients from four tests that
address potential concerns regarding inconsistent parameter estimates, bi-
ased standard errors, and bias due to the extrapolation of estimated bailout
probabilities. For ease of comparison, we reproduce the coefﬁcients from
the Baseline two-stage probit estimation in the ﬁrst pair of columns.
–Table 6 around here –
We begin by estimating the system with ordinary least squares (OLS) in the
columns labeled Identiﬁcation. Although OLS estimates can be inefﬁcient
and standard errors might be biased, this approach yields consistent and
unbiased estimates for the coefﬁcients. More important for our study, OLS
identiﬁes the moral hazard effect solely through the exclusion restriction on
the covariates, which mitigates any concern that we have merely estimated
a nonlinear relationship and labeled it moral hazard. The main coefﬁcient
of interest on moral hazard remains positively signiﬁcant and resembles a
magnitude similar to the marginal effect of ˆ p (0.072) reported previously.
Overestimation is plausible, given the non-linearity accounted for by the
probit model.
We previously clustered standard errors at the bank level and accounted
for cross-sectional correlation by using time dummies, as suggested by Pe-
tersen (2009, p. 458). Yet Petersen also cautions that standard errors still
23may be biased if time effects are not ﬁxed and suggests two-way clustering
of standard errors by bank and period. Although such an effect is probably
less an issue in our short panel of 11 periods, the results in the Two-way clus-
tering columns conﬁrm the positive moral hazard effect, previous estimates
of identifying covariates, and almost all other explanatory variables. Note
that the magnitude of coefﬁcients cannot be compared directly to the base-
line speciﬁcation because of the scaling by the two-way clustered standard
errors.
As a third check of the robustness of standard errors, we bootstrap the sys-
tem of two equations jointly. In contrast with conventional bootstrapping of
standard errors in the risk equation based on identical bailout probability
estimates, we draw random samples with replacements for both the bailout
and the risk equation. Standard errors in the columns System bootstrap are
slightly larger but do not affect the qualitative implications we reported
previously; all the key parameters remain statistically signiﬁcant. 25
Finally, we estimate Equations (1) and (4) simultaneously with maximum
likelihoodestimation(MLE)accordingtoEquations(5a)-(5c).Thisapproach
alsoaddressestheconcernthatthestandarderrorsinthetwo-stepapproach
might suffer from bias and be inefﬁcient. The upshot of the result in the
Joint system columns is that the moral hazard coefﬁcient ˆ p remains signif-
icantly positive. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient is hard to interpret due
to the re-scaling of the coefﬁcients in binary dependent variable models.
Most bank-speciﬁc covariates are also in line with previous results. For var-
ious speciﬁcations, maximization is difﬁcult if certain traits discriminate
one of the three outcomes almost deterministically – a common problem in
25 Further robustness checks included two-way clustering by bank and state, as well as state and year, random
effects probit, and annual estimation. Results are qualitatively unchanged and available on request.
24polytonomous limited dependent models. Therefore, we rely on two-stage
estimates, which are consistent with the MLE results.
4.4 Ownership
Banks from the three banking pillars differ, among other things, accord-
ing to their ownership structure and the regional scope of their activities
(Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). Ownership structure is of crucial importance
for the governance of banks (Adams, 2010) so in Table 7, we provide the
subsample results to account for these differences (see also Gropp et al.,
2011). 26
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In the second pair of columns labelled Local banks, we compare results from
a subsample that excludes the largest banks from all three pillars to the
marginal effects of the baseline. Within each sector, only a few large banks
are active nation-wide, namely, the so-called big four in the commercial sec-
tor, 27 one central cooperative bank (DZ Bank), and central savings banks
("Landesbanken"). 28 These excluded largest banks are monitored by inter-
nationalﬁnancialmarkets,whichtradetheirequityand/orsecuritizeddebt.
But the vast majority of the 3,517 banks in our sample conﬁne their opera-
tions either de jure (savings banks) or de facto (cooperatives, many commer-
cial banks) to regionally demarcated markets. These banks are all legally in-
dependent institutions. Hence, group holdings highlighted by Dinç (2006)
26 Afull-ﬂedgedanalysisofbankownership,governance,andmoralhazard,wouldrequiredataonexecutiveand
supervisory board traits. Because publication requirements for most banks are mild, such data are not readily, if
at all, available. Therefore, that approach is beyond the present paper’s scope.
27 Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, HypoVereinsbank, and Postbank as of 2010.
28 BayernLB, Bremer Landesbank, HSH Nordbank, Landesbank Baden-Wurttenberg, Landesbank Berlin, Lan-
desbank Hessen-Thuringen, Norddeutsche Landesbank, Landesbank Saar, and WestLB.
25as instrumental to the governance of Japanese banks are absent for virtually
all German banks. Observations in both bailout and risk-taking equations
are reduced, but obviously only slightly. The estimated moral hazard effect
remains signiﬁcantly positive and is somewhat larger.
A ﬁrst test for ownership differences refers to savings banks, which are
owned by (regional) governments. Government-owned banks may pur-
sue different, non-value-maximizing objectives (Sapienza, 2004). The pair
of columns labelled Local non-savings banks shows the effects after exclud-
ing all savings banks, both local and Landesbanken. The marginal effect
of bailout probability with respect to distress is 0.101%; moral hazard thus
is not a phenomenon driven by government ownership in German bank-
ing. This effect is conﬁrmed when we include large non-savings banks in
the columns All non-savings banks. The results resemble those of Barth et al.
(2004), who ﬁnd no effect of government ownership on bank risk after con-
trolling for regulatory traits and supervisory practices.
Apart from government ownership, Gorton and Rosen (1995) show that
larger equity stakes of managers can lead to excessive risk taking by large
and listed bank holding companies. In our sample, commercial and coop-
erative banks are privately owned. However, the share of publicly incorpo-
rated banks is only 4%, of which only few are joint stock companies with
free-ﬂoating equity traded in capital markets. The vast majority are cooper-
ative banks, which are mutually owned by their members. Members are the
depositors and are dispersed. Although we have no information on own-
ership shares of managers, (dominant) ownership by managers is therefore
unlikely to play as an important role in German banking.
26To test for the potentially important role of capital markets for governance
though, and hence risk taking, we split the sample into publicly and pri-
vatelyincorporatedbanks.Forthelatter,publicationrequirementsarestricter.
The last two pairs of columns of Table 7 show that moral hazard has a sig-
niﬁcantly positive effect for non-listed banks. We recommend caution about
interpreting the absence of moral hazard for publicly incorporated banks as
evidence of better governance by capital markets. More likely, this result is
due to the substantially reduced sample size, rather than a robust case in
favor of capital markets efﬁciently monitoring the risk taking of banks.
In summary, the moral hazard effect is driven by the large group of mutu-
ally owned cooperative banks that dominate the sample. Differences in the
regional scope of activities, government ownership, and public incorpora-
tion do not contaminate the overall result.
4.5 Can Supervisors Mitigate Moral Hazard?
The BaFin can intervene with different degrees of severity in the going con-
cerns of ﬁnancial institutions that it deems at risk. This scenario begs the
question: Can supervisory actions mitigate moral hazard? We obtain data
from the supervisory department of the Bundesbank that collects all in-
tervention measures and categorize them into four groups. Interventions
differ from capital preservations measures, which are conducted by the in-
surance schemes of each banking sector in consultation with the auditors
of the respective banking organizations (e.g., DSGV, BVR). Interventions,
instead, are actions taken solely by the ofﬁcial authority (BaFin) in pursuit
of its mandate to ensure ﬁnancial stability.
27Table B.2 in the Appendix reveals the frequency and detailed composition
of intervention categories. The ﬁrst category, called “warnings,” groups
admonishment hearings, ofﬁcial disapproval with the bank, or threats of
further measures. The second category, “management,” comprises events
that interfere with stafﬁng decisions of the bank, such as the rejection of
branch director appointments, limitations of the permitted scope of man-
agers’ responsibilities, or appointment of a supervisory ofﬁcer. The “restric-
tions” category includes events such as prohibitions against distributing
dividends, accepting new loans, or accepting new deposits. The category
“penalties” contains measures that require the bank or managers to pay
ﬁnes.
Sound banks may be subject to interventions based on their behavior, too.
For example, a bank that has gambled and won might receive a warning
but not require a capital injection. The distribution of intervention types
for both sound and distressed banks is in Table B.2 in the Appendix. For
example, warnings pertain primarily to sound banks, but outright restric-
tions occur more often for banks that eventually exit or receive capital sup-
port. Table B.2 indicates that regulators intervene rather frequently in banks
considered sound, according to our deﬁnition. Thus, interventions neither
mimic capital preservation measures taken by insurance schemes nor are
they an ultimate resort of the regulator in terms of forcing banks to exit
through mergers.
Table 8 shows the marginal effects of different speciﬁcations of Equations
(4) and (3) with direct effects of predicted bailout probabilities and interac-
tion terms with intervention category indicators. Across all speciﬁcations,
the moral hazard parameter remains signiﬁcantly positive and thus corrob-
28orates our baseline results. We focus on the interaction effect of interven-
tions on risk to test if moral hazard is mitigated by supervisory actions.
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Consider ﬁrst the speciﬁcation labelled Distress in Table 8, which resembles
the baseline speciﬁcation, though augmented with direct and interacted in-
tervention category indicators. Positive marginal effects for the direct terms
of management and restriction interventions indicate that distressed banks
are signiﬁcantly more likely to receive regulatory attention. Note that this
effect does not imply that the regulator fails to reduce moral hazard. In-
stead, the effect of interventions on moral hazard is reﬂected in the interac-
tion term.
Only the interaction effects for the categories “Management” and “Penal-
ties” are signiﬁcantly negative. There is some discussion about how to in-
terpret interaction effects in nonlinear models. Ai and Norton (2003) cau-
tion that a proper evaluation of marginal interaction terms in non-linear
(probit) models requires consideration of the cross-partial derivative of the
dependent variable, that is, the probability of distress in our setting. Figures
A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix show the distribution for the total interaction
terms according to the Management and Penalty interventions. Interaction
effects are observation speciﬁc and indicate that supervisory actions against
managers reduce the probability of distress by 0.62 percentage points (see
the notes to Figure A.3). Given an average probability of distress of 8%, this
reduction is substantial. The mitigating effect of penalties is 0.45 percentage
points. But as indicated by the distribution of z-statistics in the right panel
of Figure A.4, the effect is insigniﬁcant for many observations in the sample
at the 5%-level (indicated by the red horizontal lines), as is corroborated by
29the mean z-statistic (A.4).
This result has important policy implications, because it shows that super-
visors have effective tools to discipline banks at their disposal. Sturdy su-
pervisory measures penalizing management and involving pecuniary ﬁnes
can reduce the adverse effects of moral hazard. However, frequently used
weaksupervisorymeasures,namelywarnings,donotdisciplinemoralhaz-
ard. 29
An important caveat is raised however by Greene (2009), who acknowl-
edges that Ai and Norton (2003) are technically correct but also questions
whether the interpretation of total marginal effects is informative to test
hypotheses or the economic magnitude of individual total marginal effects
even can be interpreted. Our aim is not to resolve this debate. However,
to qualify our analysis, we show in the remaining columns of Table 8 the
speciﬁcations of Equation (3) using alternative risk measures.
These linear alternatives avoid the discussion of total marginal effects and
highlight that the effects of interventions depend on how risk gets mea-
sured. The mitigation of moral hazard is conﬁrmed for pecuniary penalties:
z-scores and Tier I capital ratios increase, and the share of NPL and net
ﬁxed interest rate assets are reduced. The large marginal effects for the rel-
evant interaction terms reﬂect the low frequency of interventions in this
category (see Table B.2 in the Appendix). The mitigating effect of manage-
ment interventions is never signiﬁcant though. Only warnings reduce risk,
as measured by core capital ratios or ﬁxed interest rate gaps.
29 Note that warnings may reduce the risk taking of banks as such, which we cannot identify in this speciﬁcation.
If a warning was needed and if it was successful, we do not observe differences between sound banks and banks
that have been warned and changed their behavior accordingly.
30In summary, the effect of different interventions on mitigating moral haz-
ard differs across risk measures. An exception are penalties, which reduce
moral hazard according to almost any risk measure. For our preferred dis-
tress indicator, moral hazard due to safety nets can be reduced by interven-
tions targeting the bank’s management. Weak interventions are ineffective.
5 Conclusion
We test if bailout expectations increase moral hazard in the banking indus-
try in terms of excessive risk-taking behavior. To this end, we develop a si-
multaneous structural equations model. In a ﬁrst stage we estimate bailout
probabilities, and in a second stage we regress measures for risk-taking be-
havior on the estimated bail out probabilities. Moral hazard is estimated
as the sensitivity of distress probabilities with respect to an increase in the
expected probability of a bank receiving capital preservation measures.
To separate bad luck from bad behavior, we suggest several novel identi-
fying covariates that explain bailouts, but do not directly affect risk-taking
behavior. Speciﬁcally, we identify the effect of moral hazard on risk taking
based on regional political factors, differences across regulatory institutions
responsible per bank, and regional banking market traits.
We combine these identifying covariates with a unique sample provided
by the German central bank that contains detailed information on capital
injections, regulatory interventions, and distressed exits at the bank level.
The sample includes 3,517 German banks from 1995 until 2006, covering
virtually the entire population, of which approximately 8% are in distress.
31Our results reveal that an increase in the expected bailout probability by
1% increases the probability of being in distress by 7.2 basis points. The
marginal effect of moral hazard on risk taking is large compared to other
bank-speciﬁc risk determinants. In fact, an increase of bailout expectations
from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean implies an increase in predicted distress probabilities by
3.2%. Given the mean distress probability of 8%, this effect is substantial.
The result that safety nets in banking fuel moral hazard is robust across
a wide range of alternative methods we used to estimate this structural
model. Five alternative measures of risk taking corroborate the signiﬁcance
ofmoralhazard,too.Estimationsfordifferentsubsamplesofbankinggroups
showthatthemoralhazardeffectisnotdrivenbygovernment-ownedbanks.
Instead, the results are predominantly driven by the largest group of mutu-
ally owned cooperative banks. For the subsample of publicly incorporated
banks, we cannot detect a signiﬁcant moral hazard effect, which is likely to
reﬂect the small subsample of listed banks in Germany.
An important policy implication is the result that selected supervisory in-
terventions can mitigate moral hazard. The moral hazard effect on the prob-
ability of distress is signiﬁcantly reduced if interventions aim directly at the
bank’s management or involve pecuniary penalties. Therefore, stern inter-
ventions are effective, whereas weaker measures such as warnings which
aremoreoftenused,actuallyareineffectiveinreducingmoralhazard.Man-
agerialinterventioneffectsdifferthoughwhenweconsideralternativemea-
sures of risk, though the mitigation of moral hazard is robust for penalties.
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Sound and distressed banks over time
Year Sound Distressed Total
Bailout Exit
N % of total N % of total N % of total N
1995 3,238 94.3 165 4.8 32 0.9 3,435
1996 3,111 93.8 176 5.3 28 0.8 3,315
1997 2,975 92.7 189 5.9 47 1.5 3,211
1998 2,812 92.0 174 5.7 69 2.3 3,055
1999 2,576 91.5 169 6.0 71 2.5 2,816
2000 2,323 90.9 167 6.5 65 2.5 2,555
2001 2,114 89.6 171 7.2 74 3.1 2,359
2002 1,946 89.5 172 7.9 56 2.6 2,174
2003 1,819 89.7 157 7.7 52 2.6 2,028
2004 1,767 91.6 135 7.0 27 1.4 1,929
2005 1,728 92.6 113 6.1 26 1.4 1,867
2006 1,696 94.0 87 4.8 21 1.2 1,804
Total 28,105 92.0 1,875 6.1 568 1.9 30,548
Notes: Based on banks with complete cases in the regression analysis. Distress is deﬁned as the occurrence
of either a bailout or exit of the bank due to a restructuring merger induced by the regulator. Bailout is
deﬁned as a capital injection by the responsible insurance fund of the bank.
36Table 2
Descriptive statistics identifying variables
Event Variable Mean SD Percentile N
1st 99th
Bailout Injection frequency per statet 1 79.15 12.87 50.00 100.00 1,875
Number of banks in countyt 17.58 35.17 1.00 239.00 1,875
State parliament electiont 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 1,875
Vote share difference cabinet and oppositiont 20.28 14.22 1.97 65.18 1,875
State government vote sharet 53.83 6.91 35.87 78.82 1,875
(Major) opposition vote sharet 33.55 9.63 10.73 46.81 1,875
Conservativest 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 1,875
Socialistst 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 1,875
Great coalitiont 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 1,875
Exit Injection frequency per statet 1 73.74 14.86 16.67 100.00 568
Number of banks in countyt 17.83 22.54 2.44 101.00 568
State parliament electiont 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 568
Vote share difference cabinet and oppositiont 16.50 12.03 1.18 65.18 568
State government vote sharet 52.26 6.21 35.87 78.82 568
(Major) opposition vote sharet 35.76 8.19 10.73 46.81 568
Conservativest 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 568
Socialistst 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 568
Great coalitiont 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 568
Total Injection frequency per statet 1 77.89 13.55 35.71 100.00 2,443
Number of banks in countyt 17.64 32.67 1.00 230.00 2,443
State parliament electiont 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 2,443
Vote share difference cabinet and oppositiont 19.40 13.83 1.97 65.18 2,443
State government vote sharet 53.46 6.79 35.87 78.82 2,443
(Major) opposition vote sharet 34.06 9.36 10.73 46.81 2,443
Conservativest 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 2,443
Socialistst 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 2,443
Great coalitiont 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 2,443
Notes: Injection frequencies per state are the ratio of bailed-out banks relative to distressed banks lagged
by one period. State parliament election is an indicator equal to 1 in the year of elections, which are held
every four to ﬁve years, but at different dates in each of the 16 federal states. Vote share difference is
calculated, as in Dinç and Gupta (2011), as the difference between the vote share of total votes cast for the
governingcoalitionlessthevotesharecastforthemainopposition.Allsharesofvotespertaintocastvotes
per county (“Kreis”) in state parliament elections. State government and (main) opposition vote share are
the two components to calculate the vote share difference. Conservatives is an indicator equal to 1 if
the state government is led by the Christian Democratic Union ("CDU, Christlich Demokratische Union").
Socialists is an indicator equal to 1 if the state government is led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD,
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). Great coalition is an indicator equal to 1 if the state government is
composed of both Conservatives and Socialists.
37Table 3
Descriptive statistics explanatory variables
Sound Bailout Exit Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sizet 1 5.56 2.90 6.12 2.11 4.50 2.55 5.58 2.86
Hidden reservest 1 0.36 0.57 0.08 0.22 0.12 0.35 0.33 0.55
Non-performing loan sharet 1 9.78 8.72 13.22 10.30 11.77 10.39 10.03 8.90
Customer loan sharet 1 81.79 14.13 78.70 14.02 76.97 17.76 81.51 14.23
Return on equityt 1 22.22 12.37 15.99 14.49 13.86 14.68 21.68 12.69
Fee to interest income ratiot 1 29.88 398.53 28.16 29.42 30.48 59.69 29.79 382.42
Cost efﬁciencyt 1 76.25 5.65 74.70 6.65 74.51 8.47 76.13 5.80
Liquid asset sharet 1 2.08 1.13 2.40 1.11 2.19 1.12 2.10 1.13
Regional market sharet 1 15.34 22.01 15.58 20.90 9.58 17.21 15.24 21.88
Public limited company indicatort 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
Corporate insolvenciest 1 0.89 0.39 1.08 0.54 0.97 0.47 0.90 0.41
Annual real GSP per capita growtht 1 1.30 1.39 1.72 1.78 1.45 1.74 1.33 1.43
State unemployment ratet 1 8.82 3.04 10.15 4.52 9.35 4.07 8.91 3.19
Observations 28,105 1,875 568 30,548
Notes: Variables are deﬁned as follows: Size deciles are based on the distribution of gross total assets across
all banks per year. Hidden reserves due to below market value valuations, according to §340f commercial code
(HGB), represent a share of total assets. Non-performing loans equal the share of latent risk loans relative to the
total of audited loans. Customer loans are the share of lending volume to private and non-ﬁnancial corporate
customers relative to total loans. Proﬁtability is measured as operating return relative to total equity. The income
structure is measured by the ratio of net fee income relative to net interest income. Cost efﬁciency is the percentage
of actual cost that would have sufﬁced to provide observed production plans, derived from a stochastic cost
frontier model. Liquidity is measured as the sum of cash and overnight interbank assets relative to total assets.
Market shares are based on gross total asset shares of each bank in each year of aggregate gross total assets in
their county (“Kreis”). Public limited company is a dummy equal to 1 if the banking ﬁrm is incorporated either as
a stock listed company or a private limited partnership (“Kapitalgesellschaft"). Corporate insolvencies are the ratio
of corporate ﬁrms in the state that ﬁled for bankruptcy relative to the total number of ﬁrms. Gross state product
per capita growth is measured per state and in real terms in prices of 2005. The unemployment rate per state
equals the share of registered unemployed workers and employees as a share of the entire social-security insured
population.
38Table 4
Identiﬁcation of bailout probabilities and moral hazard effects
Parsimonious Politics Associations Regulator
Equation Bailout Distress Bailout Distress Bailout Distress Bailout Distress
Explanatory covariates (X)
Predicted bailout 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.072***
probabilityt [0.021] [0.020] [0.016] [0.012]
Sizet 1 0.062*** 0.005*** 0.063*** 0.005*** 0.062*** 0.005*** 0.064*** 0.005***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.001]
Hidden reservest 1 -0.098*** -0.075*** -0.096*** -0.076*** -0.074** -0.078*** -0.076** -0.075***
[0.034] [0.008] [0.033] [0.008] [0.033] [0.007] [0.033] [0.007]
Non-performing 0.002** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001***
loan sharet 1 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Customer loan 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000
sharet 1 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Return on equityt 1 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Fee to interest 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
income ratiot 1 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cost efﬁciencyt 1 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Liquid asset sharet 1 0.010 0.003* 0.010 0.003* 0.011 0.003* 0.008 0.003*
[0.012] [0.002] [0.012] [0.002] [0.012] [0.002] [0.012] [0.001]
Regional market 0.002*** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.002** -0.000
sharet 1 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Public limited -0.183* -0.026*** -0.190* -0.027*** -0.203** -0.027*** -0.206** -0.027***
company indicatort [0.099] [0.007] [0.101] [0.007] [0.101] [0.007] [0.104] [0.007]
Corporate insolvenciest 1 0.093* 0.029*** 0.122** 0.030*** 0.134** 0.031*** 0.179*** 0.028***
[0.052] [0.010] [0.054] [0.010] [0.055] [0.009] [0.056] [0.009]
Annual real GSP 0.003 0.006*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.009 0.006*** 0.011 0.006***
per capita growtht 1 [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001]
State unemployment -0.006 0.003** -0.014* 0.003** -0.010 0.003** -0.020** 0.003**
ratet 1 [0.006] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001] [0.009] [0.001]
continued on next page
39continued from previous page
Parsimonious Politics Associations Regulator
Bailout Distress Bailout Distress Bailout Distress Bailout Distress
Identifying covariates (Z)
Injection frequency 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002**
per statet 1 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Number of banks 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001*
in countyt [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
State parliament -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.058** -0.055**
electiont [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
Vote share difference 0.002
cabinet to oppositiont [0.001]
Conservatives  0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005**
vote share differencet [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Socialists  0.001 0.001 0.004
vote share differencet [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Great coalition  -0.003 -0.005* -0.007***
Vote share differencet [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Socialistst 0.068* 0.036 -0.018
[0.040] [0.050] [0.054]
Great coalitiont 0.183*** 0.201*** 0.212***
[0.044] [0.032] [0.028]
Dummies included for:
Years x x x x x x x x
Banking ’pillar’ x x x x x x x x
Responsible banking association x x
Regional Bundesbank branch x
Diagnostics and F-tests for identifying covariates
Observations 2,443 30,548 2,443 30,548 2,443 30,548 2,443 30,548
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.165 0.182 0.165 0.205 0.166 0.217 0.170
Log-likelihood value -1,087 -7,105 -1,084 -7,105 -1,053 -7,097 -1,037 -7,064
F-test all 29.6 33.8 270.7 874.3
p-value all 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test base 23.1 14.5 12.6
p-value base 0.000 0.002 0.000
F-test politics 9.5 14.9 10.6
p-value politics 0.090 0.011 0.060
F-test association 218.3 401.3
p-value association 0.000 0.000
F-test regulator 418.4
p-value regulator 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects from two-stage probit estimations of Equations (1) and (4). The dependent variable in the bailout equation is an indicator equal to 1 if the
bank received capital preservation measures (bailout). The control group consists of bank-year observations of exits due to a restructuring merger. The dependent
variable in the distress equation is equal to 1 if a bank either exited due to a restructuring merger or received capital preservation measures. Expanatory and
identifying covariates are deﬁned as in Tables 2 and 3 and and are lagged, as indicated by subscripts. Time and banking pillar indicators are included but not
reported. There are 37 responsible banking association indicators and eight central bank branch ("Hauptverwaltung") indicators. F-tests pertain to identifying
covariates, and labels indicate the groups tested to be jointly signiﬁcant. Standard errors clustered at the bank-level are in brackets. */**/*** denote signiﬁcance at
the 10%/5%/1% levels, respectively.
40Table 5
Marginal effects for alternative risk measures
Dependent Distress z-score NPL share Tier I NFIRA FIRG
Predicted bailout probabilityt 0.072*** -1.485** 5.497*** -0.522 -1.935** -0.079**
[0.012] [0.598] [0.908] [0.469] [0.953] [0.036]
Sizet 1 0.005*** -0.213*** 0.031 -0.314*** -0.312*** -0.055***
[0.001] [0.063] [0.097] [0.062] [0.097] [0.004]
Hidden reservest 1 -0.075*** -0.108 -0.298* 0.852*** 3.414*** 0.027**
[0.007] [0.200] [0.176] [0.114] [0.385] [0.013]
Non-performing loan sharet 1 0.001*** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.104*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.011] [0.008] [0.015] [0.001]
Customer loan sharet 1 -0.000 -0.036*** 0.089*** -0.169*** -0.023 0.004***
[0.000] [0.011] [0.011] [0.017] [0.016] [0.001]
Return on equityt 1 -0.002*** -0.024** -0.009 -0.028*** 0.047*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.014] [0.001]
Fee to interest income ratiot 1 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* 0.001 -0.000*** -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Cost efﬁciencyt 1 -0.001*** 0.121*** 0.005 -0.135*** -0.072*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.015] [0.013] [0.041] [0.027] [0.001]
Liquid asset sharet 1 0.003* -0.343*** 0.132* 0.114 0.249 0.037***
[0.001] [0.095] [0.079] [0.204] [0.166] [0.007]
Regional market sharet 1 -0.000 0.007 -0.032*** 0.001 0.005 0.002***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.010] [0.000]
Public limited company indicatort -0.027*** -0.023 -0.133 -4.869** -5.541*** -0.206**
[0.007] [1.009] [1.190] [1.892] [1.856] [0.102]
Corporate insolvenciest 1 0.028*** -1.776*** -2.623*** 0.555 -0.895 -0.164***
[0.009] [0.377] [0.390] [0.342] [0.755] [0.035]
Annual real GSP per capita growtht 1 0.006*** -0.279*** 0.364*** -0.136*** -0.189** 0.005
[0.001] [0.054] [0.062] [0.037] [0.089] [0.004]
State unemployment ratet 1 0.003** -0.234*** 0.436*** -0.147** 0.261*** 0.030***
[0.001] [0.054] [0.059] [0.061] [0.095] [0.005]
Observations 30,548 30,090 30,548 30,090 27,495 27,418
(Pseudo-)R2 0.17 0.104 0.092 0.337 0.146 0.182
Notes: Marginal effects for the estimation of the risk Equation (3). The dependent variable in the distress equation is equal to 1 if a bank either exited
due to a restructuring merger or received capital preservation measures and parameters are obtained from probit estimation. Remaining risk proxies are
continuous, as described in Table B.1, and the estimation relies on OLS. Time and banking pillar indicators are included but not reported. The z-score
is deﬁned following Laeven and Levine (2009) as
RoA+TierIcapitalratio
sRoA
. The Tier I capital ratio is equal to core capital according to Basel II regulation
relative to risk-weighted assets (RWA). Return to assets equals operating net income of the bank relative to RWA. Non-performing loans share is the
ratio of the lending volume considered at latent risk by auditors relative to the total volume of audited loans. NFIRA equals the difference between ﬁxed
interest-bearing assets and ﬁxed interest-bearing liabilities. FIRG denotes the difference between the average interest rate on ﬁxed interest rate assets
and the average interest rate on ﬁxed interest rate liabilities. Standard errors clustered at the bank-level are in brackets. */**/*** denote signiﬁcance at








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regulatory intervention and moral hazard
Dependent variable Distress z-score Tier I NPL NFIRA FIRG
Predicted bailout probabilityt 0.071*** -1.466** 0.332 5.458*** -1.931** -0.075**
[0.011] [0.599] [0.972] [0.905] [0.953] [0.036]
Warnings 0.056 -1.566 -4.548** 1.364 -4.692** 0.115
[0.052] [1.185] [1.843] [1.286] [2.092] [0.084]
Warnings  ˆ p -0.018 0.816 6.098*** 0.345 3.412 -0.238**
[0.036] [1.521] [2.147] [1.943] [2.770] [0.114]
Management 0.826*** -6.399** -8.152 -4.229 -9.431 0.119
[0.181] [3.051] [7.473] [3.123] [7.723] [0.363]
Management  ˆ p -0.400** 6.221 5.859 3.117 17.034 -0.455
[0.161] [4.701] [9.195] [6.225] [13.216] [0.561]
Restrictions 0.348* -0.819 37.247 0.335 -8.363 -0.223
[0.197] [4.097] [35.165] [2.489] [7.331] [0.301]
Restriction  ˆ p 0.047 -1.048 -38.353 -0.309 6.786 0.125
[0.060] [4.565] [36.451] [2.785] [8.779] [0.348]
Penalties 0.658 -31.552*** -9.911* 25.342* 55.140*** 1.098
[0.506] [2.171] [5.912] [14.294] [19.943] [1.043]
Penalties  ˆ p -0.320* 44.081*** 14.466* -30.268* -68.386*** -1.572
[0.167] [2.414] [7.557] [16.303] [23.617] [1.199]
Sizet 1 0.004*** -0.212*** -0.505*** 0.030 -0.312*** -0.055***
[0.001] [0.063] [0.165] [0.097] [0.097] [0.004]
Hidden reservest 1 -0.071*** -0.122 0.794*** -0.292* 3.402*** 0.026**
[0.007] [0.200] [0.231] [0.176] [0.377] [0.013]
Non-performing loan sharet 1 0.001*** -0.001 -0.069** -0.102*** 0.001
[0.000] [0.011] [0.031] [0.015] [0.001]
Customer loan sharet 1 -0.000 -0.036*** -0.248*** 0.089*** -0.023 0.004***
[0.000] [0.011] [0.057] [0.011] [0.016] [0.001]
Return on equityt 1 -0.002*** -0.025** -0.001 -0.009 0.046*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.012] [0.034] [0.009] [0.014] [0.001]
Fee to interest income ratiot 1 -0.000*** -0.000** 0.002 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Cost efﬁciencyt 1 -0.001*** 0.120*** -0.289*** 0.006 -0.073*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.015] [0.093] [0.013] [0.027] [0.001]
Liquid asset sharet 1 0.003* -0.344*** 0.645 0.132* 0.248 0.037***
[0.001] [0.095] [1.191] [0.079] [0.166] [0.007]
Regional market sharet 1 -0.000 0.007 -0.001 -0.031*** 0.005 0.002***
[0.000] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.010] [0.000]
Public limited company indicatort -0.026*** -0.033 -8.969 -0.129 -5.558*** -0.207**
[0.007] [1.009] [6.500] [1.188] [1.857] [0.102]
Corporate insolvenciest 1 0.021** -1.721*** 2.108* -2.652*** -0.833 -0.160***
[0.009] [0.376] [1.100] [0.390] [0.754] [0.035]
Annual real GSP per capita growtht 1 0.006*** -0.282*** -0.194 0.368*** -0.193** 0.005
[0.001] [0.054] [0.118] [0.062] [0.088] [0.004]
State unemployment ratet 1 0.003*** -0.233*** -0.491** 0.435*** 0.265*** 0.030***
[0.001] [0.054] [0.212] [0.059] [0.095] [0.005]
Observations 30,548 30,090 30,090 30,548 27,495 27,418
(Pseudo-) R2 0.191 0.105 0.076 0.093 0.147 0.182
Log-likelihood value -6,888 -104,355 -138,244 -107,294 -105,307 -18,238
Notes: Marginal effects for the risk Equation (4) for different measures of risk as the dependent variable. Bailout proba-
bilities from probit estimates of the bailout equation (ﬁrst-stage results from speciﬁcation labelled "Regulator" in Table
4). Risk measures are deﬁned in Table B.1. The distress speciﬁcation is estimated with probit, and all other speciﬁca-
tions with OLS. Time and banking pillar indicators are included but not reported. Direct and interaction terms refer to
four different types of intervention. Warnings comprise events such as hearings and ofﬁcial letters from the supervisor.
Management comprises measures targeting bank managers, such as replacement. Restrictions comprise interventions
prohibiting certain business activities, such as granting loans or taking deposits. Penalties are payments of ﬁnes. The
detailed intervention group composition is shown in Table B.2. Standard errors clustered at the bank-level are in brack-
ets. */**/*** denote signiﬁcant at the 10%/5%/1% level, respectively.
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Descriptive statistics for alternative risk-taking proxies
Variable Mean SD Percentile N
1st 99th
z-score 16.04 8.20 2.55 47.00 30,090
Tier 1 capital ratio 9.49 24.90 4.84 30.98 30,090
Return on risk-weighted assets (RoA) 1.69 6.92 -2.22 5.12 30,090
sRoA 1.12 5.85 0.21 6.85 30,093
Non-performing loan share 9.40 8.52 0.00 38.17 30,548
Net ﬁxed interest rate assets (NFIRA) 22.79 12.07 -8.14 49.32 27,495
Fixed interest rate gap (FIRG) 1.31 0.52 0.20 3.07 27,418
Notes: The z-score is deﬁned, following Laeven and Levine (2009), as
RoA+TierIcapitalratio
sRoA . Relevant components
are deﬁned as follows: The Tier I capital ratio is equal to core capital according to the Basel II regulation relative
to risk-weighted assets (RWA). Return to assets equals operating net income of the bank relative to RWA. Non-
performing loans share is the ratio of the lending volume considered at latent risk by auditors relative to the total
volume of audited loans. NFIRA equals the difference between ﬁxed interest-bearing assets and ﬁxed interest-
bearing liabilities. FIRG denotes the difference between the average interest rate on ﬁxed interest rate assets and
the average interest rate on ﬁxed interest rate liabilities.
Table B.2
Detailed components of regulatory intervention categories
Sound Bailout Exit Total
Warnings 707 190 28 925
Management 21 5 9 35
Restrictions 38 173 29 240
Penalties 7 3 0 10
Total interventions 773 371 66 1,210
Notes: Number of measures categorized into the four intervention classes. Multiple events are possible and accounted for
in the regressions by a count of intervention variables per bank and year. KWG refers to the German Banking Act ("Kred-
itwesengesetz"). Provisions according to the respective sections of the Banking Act are categorized as shown, depending
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